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Abstract 
 
The regulation of speed limits in the US had been centralized 
at the federal level since 1974, until decisions were devolved 
to the states in 1995. However, the centralization debate has 
reemerged in recent years. Here, we conduct the first 
econometric analysis of the determinants of speed limit laws. 
By using economic, geographic and political variables, our 
results suggest that geography -which affects private mobility 
needs and preferences- is the main factor influencing speed 
limit laws. We also highlight the role played by political 
ideology, with Republican constituencies being associated with 
higher speed limits. Furthermore, we identify the presence of 
regional and time dependence effects. By contrast, poor road 
safety outcomes do not impede the enactment of high speed 
limits. Overall, we present the first evidence of the role played 
by geographical, ideological and regional characteristics, which 
provide us with a better understanding of the formulation of 
speed limit policies.  
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Speed limit laws in America:  
Economics, politics and geography 
 
1. Introduction 
National speed limit reform has been, and still is, one of the most controversial debates in the 
transport sector in the United States. Although full devolution of the regulation of speed limits was 
enacted in 1995, the debate as to whether national laws should once more regulate this issue remains 
very much alive. Safety advocates, insurance companies and trucking associations are currently 
lobbying for a return to a lower national speed limit, as are citizen platforms concerned by safety 
outcomes that report more than 40,000 deaths each year in the United States – a third of these 
fatalities occurring in accidents due to excessive speed.  
At the political level, Hillary Clinton – while contending for the Democratic nomination for 
President - endorsed a return to a 55-mph speed limit during a speech to the National Press Club in 
Washington, DC in 2006. However, she recognized that the move would be too unpopular to 
implement nationwide. In July 2008, Senator John Warner (R-Va) made similar calls for the 
reintroduction of a 55-mph limit to reduce energy consumption and gas costs. And more recently, 
Representative Jackie Speier (D-Ca) made proposals in a Congressional bill for a national speed limit 
of 60 mph on freeways in urban areas and 65 mph in less populated areas, as a means of saving gas. 
Indeed, the current direction being taken by Obama’s administration on environmental issues, 
together with the concern to reduce CO2 emissions and energy consumption in general, are likely to 
trigger further debate on the reduction of speed limits and the recentralization of this policy.  
Over the last 30 years, the debate has focused primarily on two aspects of the policy, which can best 
be summarized in the following two questions. First, there is the need to establish who is responsible 
for establishing speed limit laws, which leads to the debate regarding policy centralization (federal 
government) vs. decentralization (states). And, second, there is the need to establish the optimal speed 
limit, and here the discussion seems to be dictated by social preferences that differ greatly across the 
country owing to markedly different valuations of private mobility and safety outcomes. Ashenfelter 
and Greenston (2004) and Ashenfelter (2006) have highlighted this trade-off between private mobility 
and safety in their attempts to estimate the value of a statistical life. Similarly, Haight (1994) has 
emphasized the need to evaluate mobility benefits and safety consequences in a unified context.  
However, much of the controversy has focused exclusively on the safety effects of speed limit laws, 
and virtually no attention has been paid to the policy drivers of speed limit regulation. The natural 
concomitant of this is that most of the literature has sought to estimate the effect of speed limit 
changes on road safety outcomes. Unfortunately, this literature delivers mixed results – in all 
probability reflecting the ideological prejudices identified by Haight (1998), providing both parties with 
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fresh empirical evidence to uphold their point of view. Yet, no significant efforts have been made to 
look beyond the debate on road safety in an attempt at understanding the confrontation itself.  
This paper contributes to the literature by being the first study –to the best of our knowledge - to 
identify the economic, geographic and political determinants of the formulation of speed limit policies, 
rather than simply attempting to predict or evaluate their safety impacts. In fact, here we examine the 
American speed limit debate in order to estimate how different valuations of the trade-off between 
private mobility and safety can shape transportation laws. In addition, we contribute to the literature 
by including within our analysis geographical and ideological factors as determinants of speed limits 
and of the stances adopted in the centralization-devolution debate, paying particular attention to the 
role played by political parties and the rationale for the current variety of speed limits across the 
United States.  
Our results suggest that geography, which has an obvious impact on private mobility needs, is the 
main factor influencing speed limit laws. However, we also find evidence of the influential role played 
by political ideology. Specifically, we report that the share of Republican voters in a state is 
significantly associated with higher speed limits. Finally, we also highlight regional clusters and time 
dependence effects as significant determinants of speed limits. By contrast, poor road safety outcomes 
do not seem to impede the enactment of higher speed limits in America, and economic variables 
appear not to play any role at all. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the history and 
politics of speed limit reforms in the US. In the third section, we identify the main differences between 
states with high and low speed limits in terms of their geographic, historic and economic variables. 
Section four describes the empirical strategy and the econometric model used to estimate legal 
determinants. In section five we present the main results obtained from our empirical analysis. Finally, 
we draw our main conclusions in the last section. 
2. History and politics of speed limit reforms 
Speed limit reform was initiated in 1974 when the Nixon administration and Congress passed the 
National Speed Limit Law, which was a provision of the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation 
Act. As a result, a 55-mph limit was established nationwide and it was predicted that this would cut 
gasoline consumption by 2.2%. This Emergency Act represented the response of the federal 
government to the 1973 oil embargo imposed by the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) on countries that allied with Israel in the Yom Kippur War.1 In addition 
                                                 
1 The Yom Kippur War was the fourth Arab-Israeli war and was fought in October 1973. A coalition of Arab 
states led by Egypt and Syria mounted a joint attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, in 
order to re-conquer the territories lost in the Six-Day War in 1967. Western countries and the United States 
supported Israel, promising to resupply all lost tanks and planes, and to send airlift supplies. 
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to the embargo, the exporting countries raised oil prices to western economies sharply. This supply 
shock led to a gasoline shortage in the US, providing thereby a rationale for energy conservation 
measures.  
The federal government carefully regulated gasoline prices and so they never rose to reflect demand, 
but local shortages, especially in populated urban areas, were recorded (Yowell, 2005). As the 
centralization of the lower national speed limit was a response to a diplomatic conflict between the US 
and Arab nations, this legislation was initially given temporary status, and it was set to expire on 30 
June 1975. However, in 1975 the regulation was given permanent status, based on the rationale that 
traffic injuries and fatalities had declined significantly (Csere, 1995; Forester, McNown and Singell, 
1984; Segal, 1987). 
Indeed, the Nixon administration had already approved the centralization of many economic 
decisions, including wage and price controls in 1971, which extended far into the everyday life of 
Americans in an attempt at combating the rising stagflation of the early 70s (Yowell, 2005).2 As such, 
the nationalization of energy policy, and in particular that of speed limit regulation, was not only a 
response to gasoline shortages but arguably also a further step along the path to government 
centralization. 
In this regard, the 1974 law, nicknamed ‘double-nickel’, represented a significant change in the 
political status quo and in the US transportation industry. Before 1974, speed limit regulation had been 
decentralized and was included among the powers reserved for the states.3 Speed limits dated from 
1901 – with Connecticut being the first state to impose a limit - and before the reform, there were 
huge disparities in state speed limits.4 
   From the outset, the implementation of a national speed limit was controversial and several 
western states opposed the measure as contravening their individual state rights. In response to this 
opposition, the government chose to tie federal highway funds to the prior enactment of a 55-mph 
speed limit in the states and, subsequently, in 1978, to the enforcement of the national speed limit.  
When the embargo was finally lifted and the shortage abated at America’s gas stations, several 
attempts were made by members of the House to amend the speed limit bill. However, for 20 years all 
such efforts were blocked by the Democratic leadership within Congress (Palmaffy, 1996). With the 
weakening of arguments linked to energy conservation, the main reasons for defending the national 
speed limit became those of increased road safety and the threat of a rise in fatality rates should speed 
                                                 
2 President Nixon imposed controls on 15 August 1971. According to Bowman and Krause (2003), attempts at 
decentralization were seemingly overwhelmed by the centralizing actions of the Kennedy-Johnson era, but 
ostensibly gained in intensity during the Nixon and Reagan-Bush years. 
3 The sole exception was the Second World War emergency speed limit of 35 mph. 
4 Before the centralization of speed limits, Montana and Idaho did not have any speed limits, while other states 
such as Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island and New Jersey established a limit of in 60 mph.   
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limits be raised. Indeed, the national speed limit was held up as being a major contributor to the 
decline in fatality rates, but the drivers’ non-compliance did undermine its political validity (Haight, 
1998).   
Thus, when the leadership and party make-up of Congress changed, the time was ripe for a partial 
reform that was introduced with the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Act of 1987 
(Yowell, 2005). This law, which received the backing of the Reagan administration, because of falling 
gasoline prices and the reduced need to save energy (Moore, 1999),5 allowed states to raise their 
maximum speed limit to 65 mph on rural interstates. Most states immediately took advantage of this 
partial devolution and increased their limits in line with the new national speed limit. However, a 
number of eastern states chose to keep the 55-mph limit. 
This reform did not, however, put an end to the debate on speed limit devolution. Western 
representatives continued to demand full powers to set higher limits, while supporters of centralization 
warned of fatality increases as a result of rises in speed limits. In fact, a number of states (Montana, 
Kansas, Nevada and Wyoming among others) passed laws that would raise their speed limits 
automatically when the federal cap came off. For this reason, when the newly-elected Republicans 
took control of both houses in 1994 and sought to devolve many functions assumed by the federal 
government – within the so-called Republican revolution, one of the first powers to go was the 
regulation of speed limits (Yowell, 2005). Thus, the repeal of the national speed limit was provided for 
under the National Highway Designation Act of 1995. On November 28, 1995, President Clinton 
reluctantly signed the legislation and the repeal became effective form December 8 of that year 
(Palmafy, 1996). In fact, President Clinton claimed to be “deeply disturbed” but signed the bill, 
nevertheless, to avoid stalling the funds earmarked for highway maintenance (Yowell, 2005). Even his 
Secretary of Transportation, Frederico Peña, implored states, for reasons of safety, to respect the 65-
mph limit (Kaye, Mulrine and Wu, 1995). Despite these efforts, 33 states raised their speed limits to 70 
mph or higher on certain portions of their roadway systems after the repeal, but at various dates as is 
shown in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that President Reagan, who agreed with the speed limit amendment but disagreed 
with other provisions of the bill, vetoed the highway authorization bill. On 2 April 1987, the Congress 
overrode the President's veto. See Segal (1987). 
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Table 1. 
Current interstate speed limits by state, 2009. 
 
   State Rural Trucks Urban 
 
Change to current  
rural speed limit 
Alabama 70 70 60 
 
05/21/96 
Alaska 65 65 65 01/15/88 
Arizona 75 75 65 12/08/95 
Arkansas 70 65 65 08/19/96 
California 70 55 65 01/08/96 
Colorado 75 75 55-65 06/24/96 
Connecticut 65 65 45-55 10/01/98 
Delaware 65 65 50-55 01/17/96 
District of Columbia - - 50 - 
Florida 70 70 70 04/08/96 
Georgia 70 70 55-65 07/01/96 
Hawaii 55-60 55-60 50 No action 
Idaho 75 65 65 05/01/96 
Illinois 65 55 55 01/25/96 
Indiana 70 65 50-55 07/01/05 
Iowa 70 70 55-65 07/01/05 
Kansas 70 70 65 03/07/96 
Kentucky 70 70 55 07/10/07 
Louisiana 70 70 60 08/15/97 
Maine 65 65 55 06/12/87 
Maryland 65 65 55-60 07/01/95 
Massachusetts 65 65 55 01/05/92 
Michigan 70 60 70 08/01/96 
Minnesota 70 70 45-60 07/01/97 
Mississippi 70 70 60-70 02/29/96 
Missouri 70 70 55-65 03/13/96 
Montana 75 65 65 05/28/99 
Nebraska 75 75 60 09/01/96 
Nevada 75 75 65 12/08/95 
New Hampshire 65 65 55 04/16/87 
New Jersey 65 65 55 01/19/98 
New Mexico 75 75 65-75 05/15/96 
New York 65 65 50-55 08/01/95 
North Carolina 75 75 65 08/05/96 
North Dakota 75 75 55-75 08/01/03 
Ohio 65 65 65 07/01/09 
Oklahoma 70-75 70-75 55-65 08/29/96 
Oregon 65 55 55-60 06/27/87 
Pennsylvania 65 65 55 07/13/95 
Rhode Island 65 65 55 05/12/96 
South Carolina 70 70 60 04/30/99 
South Dakota 75 75 65 04/01/96 
Tennessee 70 70 55 03/25/98 
Texas 70-80 70 60 02/13/08 
Utah 80 75 65 05/01/96 
Vermont 65 65 55 04/21/87 
Virginia 70 65 55-65 07/01/06, 
Washington 70 60 60 03/15/96 
West Virginia 70 70 50-60 08/25/97 
Wisconsin 65 65 55-65 06/17/87 
Wyoming 75 75 60 12/08/95 
      Source: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
 
Indeed, the political parties played an important role in establishing speed limits. The position 
adopted by the Democratic Party has been highly influential in developments associated with speed 
limit reforms. In fact, it is the leading party giving its support to lower speed limits on safety and 
environmental grounds.6 Its position on this issue and the majority it enjoyed in Congress led to the 
                                                 
6 Mention should be made of the fact that the Green Party has devoted considerable efforts to imposing 
tougher speed limits. This party, and its leader during the repeal process, Ralph Nader, argued that higher speed 
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blocking of moves by representatives of states in the west to introduce reforms during the 80s, 
although they were unable to stop the first partial devolution in 1987 following years of well-
documented non-compliance. Some years later, now with a Republican majority in both houses (the 
first time this had happened since 1952), the Clinton Administration was adamant in its rejection of 
the repeal, but reluctantly had to accept the overturn as outlined above. In fact, Clinton sought to 
influence individual state decisions through the central department of transportation. 
By the 1980s growing concern among the Republican Party became evident, particularly in the 
middle of that decade when several states were found to be in non-compliance with the national speed 
limit. In fact, in his 1980 election campaign, President Reagan promised to have it abolished, but he 
was to take a somewhat more relaxed attitude when he took office.7 An excellent illustration of 
conservative think tank opinion is provided by Copulos (1986). The report highlights the effects of 
increasing non-compliance and urges congress to recognize that the 55-mph limit was not a major 
factor in saving either lives or fuel, while the costs incurred by slower journeys were considerable. The 
national speed limit law was presented as violating state rights, and was used as a symbol of the 
commitment on the part of the new Republican majority to limit federal government.  
Indeed, Republican support for repeal was compelling in the Senate, with only 3 of its 54 senators 
(5%) casting their vote against. By contrast, opinion was more divided among the Democrats, with 14 
out of 46 (30%) voting in favor of repeal. The 65-to-35 result allowed the national speed limit to be 
repealed.  
Of greater interest than the overall distribution of votes in the Senate was the position taken by those 
senators that did not vote according to the expected party line, for example, the Republicans that 
voted against repeal and the Democrats that voted in favor. An analysis, however, of their state of 
origin shows that individual decisions were probably motivated by the constituency they represented. 
Table 2 lists the names of these Democrat senators and the state in which they were elected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
limits and the repeal of the 55-mph national limit were an assault on the sanctity of human life. However, in 
practice the Green Party had little political influence on the reforms made. 
7 See article by Paul Grimes published in the New York Times on 26 December 1982.  
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              Democrat senators favoring the repeal by electoral state. 
Table 2. 
State 
 
 
Democrats 
Democrat Senator  
favoring the repeal 
 
Second Democrat Senator 
 favoring the repeal 
Florida 
1/1 
Graham (D-FL) - 
Georgia 
1/1 
Nunn (D-GA) - 
Hawaii 
1/2 
Inouye (D-HI) - 
Louisiana 
2/2 
Breaux (D-LA) Johnston (D-LA) 
Massachusetts 
1/2 
Kerry (D-MA) - 
Montana 
1/1 
Baucus (D-MT) - 
Nevada 
2/2 
Bryan (D-NV) Reid (D-NV) 
New Mexico 
1/1 
Bingaman (D-NM) - 
North Dakota 
1/2 
Conrad (D-ND) - 
Vermont 
1/1 
Leahy (D-VT) - 
Virginia 
1/1 
Robb (D-VA) - 
Wisconsin 
1/2 
Feingold (D-WI) -  
 
As can be seen, most of these senators represented low population density states, which were some of 
the first to raise the speed limit following repeal. Interesting cases are provided by the votes cast in 
favor by the senators of Louisiana and Nevada, as well as those cast by the senators of Montana, New 
Mexico and Vermont. Exceptions to this pattern are provided by the voting behavior of Sen. Kerry in 
Massachusetts and Sen. Graham in Florida. 
   Among the three Republicans that voted against the repeal, Sens. Chafee, Hatfield and Warner were 
elected in Rhode Island, Oregon and Virginia respectively, three states with low speed limits that did 
not raise the limit following the repeal. However, all three states have relatively high population 
densities. 
The decisive Republican action taken in the Senate on this issue reflects the party’s role in 
representing those values that they felt were coming under direct “attack” by maintaining a low 
national speed limit. This, after all, is the party that defends limited federal government and individual 
liberty over government control. Given its position, it was hardly surprising that the new Republican 
majority in the 1994 Congress should decide to adopt national speed limit repeal as a symbol of the 
so-called Republican Revolution committed to fighting centralization. 
 
3. Determinants of speed limit laws: Descriptive statistics 
Having reviewed the history of speed limit reforms in the United States and given the variety of 
regulations introduced over the last 15 years across the country, this section discusses the determinants 
of speed limit laws by drawing on descriptive statistics of the geographic, demographic, economic and 
transport characteristics of the individual states. Table 3 presents these data for the states grouped 
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according to the speed limit applied in their territory. In this way, it should be possible to identify the 
primary differences between states with high and low speed limits. Indeed, these descriptive statistics 
reflect how geography, economy and private mobility needs seem to account for the speed limits that 
have been adopted.  
Table 3. 
Demographic and economic characteristics of states grouped by speed limit levels. 
 Density 
(population/Km2) 
Previous 
Speed Limit 
(before 1974) 
Private 
Vehicle-Miles 
driven per 
inhabitant 
(thousands) 
Fatality  
Rate  
1994/1995 
GDP per 
capita ($) 
 
% Border 
States 
with high 
Speed 
Limit 
Current Speed 
Limit 
      
>65 31.1 72.97 1,395 1.98 33,880 98 
≤ 65 139.9 66.94 762 1.43 40,915 36 
Action after 
Repeal 
   
Reaction 1995-
1997 
44.8 72.09 1,284 1.92 34,982 - 
No immediate 
action 
103.0 68.68 977 1.55 38,747 - 
 
As can be seen, the states that adopted higher speed limits present relatively low population densities. 
These states tend to be large states with low levels of population, which before the centralization of 
the policy in 1974 already applied high speed limits. These geographical characteristics mean that 
citizen private mobility is an important issue. Indeed this greater need for mobility is highlighted by 
the fact that those resident in states with higher speed limits drive more miles per capita than their 
counterparts in states with low speed limits. Thus, we can expect citizens resident in these states to 
attach more value to the time savings achieved by using their private vehicles, being more dependent 
on private mobility. By contrast, citizens in small dense regions tend to be greater consumers of public 
transport, and when they do use their private vehicles, they are more severely affected by traffic 
congestion in their daily commute to work. Moreover, state distances tend to be shorter given that 
they live in states with a smaller territorial area. 
Our data also show that the states that chose to raise their speed limits were, in fact, those that 
reported higher rates of road fatalities per miles driven before the repeal. However, these poor safety 
standards did not stop them reintroducing higher speed limits. Therefore, mobility needs and the 
ability to make time savings seem to be more highly valued social preferences of citizens resident in 
those states that chose to raise their speed limits. 
It is also apparent that states with higher speed limits have a lower GDP per capita than those that 
retained the lower speed limit. Similar results are obtained when using personal income instead of 
GDP. However, income inequality, as measured by the Gini index, does not reveal significant 
interstate differences. 
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A further interesting fact is the regional nature reflected by this policy. This is illustrated by the final 
column in Table 3 which shows the percentage number of states that have introduced speed limits 
above 65 mph and which share a border with each other. Our results indicate that states with high 
speed limit laws tend to be surrounded by other states with similarly high speed limits (98%). By 
contrast, states with low speed limits only share borders on 36% of occasions with states with high 
speed limit laws. To further highlight this regional relationship we conducted two additional exercises: 
Figure 1 shows a map of the United States in which the states are distinguished according to their 
speed limit laws; and Figure 2 shows the results of a median spline regression highlighting the 
importance of geographical location in determining speed limits.  
 
Figure 1. Map of the United States distinguishing between states on the basis of their current rural 
speed limit on motorways.  
 
 
The map clearly highlights regional clusters, with the northeastern states tending to set lower speed 
limits, in common with the coastal states in general. By contrast, southern and western states generally 
have higher speed limit laws.  
This geographical distribution is also captured using non-parametric techniques. Median spline 
regressions provide interesting information, as they do not rely on any assumptions regarding 
functional forms. Figure 2 shows the relationship between speed limits and the geographical 
longitude and latitude occupied by the states. In the case of longitude, the results show a readily 
identifiable inverted U-shape relationship, while we find no clear pattern in the case of latitude. The 
first graph indicates that states on both coasts seem to set low speed limits, while as we move 
westward the central states fix higher speed limits.  
In short, geographical characteristics seem to play a major role in the establishment of speed limits 
because of the impact they have on private mobility needs. Other factors, including the previous speed 
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limit in force (which points to a time-dependence effect) and economic variables such as GDP, seem 
to account for differences between the two groups of states. In spite of the on-going debate regarding 
road safety impacts, fatality rates do not seem to be a significant factor – or at least significant enough 
- to determine the speed limit in states with obvious private mobility needs. Regional patterns have 
also been identified as an important determinant, as captured in the application of various strategies.  
Figure 2. Median Spline Regressions. Relationship between speed limits and degrees of geographical 
longitude and latitude. 
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4. Empirical Strategy: Parametric analysis 
Following the repeal, several states chose to raise their speed limits; others decided to leave them 
unaltered and retain the law as it then stood. Moreover, not all the states who decided to raise the 
speed limit enacted the same increases. This great variety of speed limits 15 years after the repeal 
allows us to test the factors that might have influenced state decision making in this policy area, and in 
particular, to estimate the importance of several geographical, economic and political variables that 
might reflect social preferences in the establishment of desired speed limits. Thus, here we seek to 
explain current speed limit levels in relation to the characteristics highlighted above. Equation (1) 
provides a summary of the model used, which is estimated using OLS estimates and correcting for 
heterogeneity. The parametric model used is as follows: 
 
Yi = βXi + εi             (1) 
 
where Yi denotes the current speed limit in force in state i. A vector of determinants of speed limits is 
denoted by Xi, and εi is the error term. Among the vector of determinants, we distinguish according to 
geographical, economic and political variables.  
Geographical regressors can be considered responsible for the need for private mobility. Thus, we 
expect large states (SIZE) with low levels of population (POP95) to set higher speed limits, given their 
greater need for private mobility. Similarly, states at higher altitudes (ALTITUDE) tend to be rural 
states, which also choose to set higher speed limits. This variable should also take into consideration 
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coastal states. However, the states with the greatest need for private mobility are usually those that 
have the worst safety records. For this reason, we also include the number of road fatalities per 100 
million miles driven in private vehicles per inhabitant (FAT95), to verify as to whether or not safety 
outcomes prevent the introduction of higher speed limits. The two variables capturing the tradeoff 
between private mobility needs (MDRIVEN95) and safety (FAT95) are measured in terms of data 
available for 1995, that is to say, just before the repeal was passed so as to avoid endogeneity problems 
in the estimation. Mobility needs, however, will be substitute it by different geographical and 
demographic variables as State size, population and altitude. 
Political parties have played an important role both in the repeal of the national speed limit and in 
the debate on speed limit levels. In order to determine whether the ideology of the state constituency 
is a driver of its speed limit level we include its share of Republican voters in presidential elections 
(REPPRES). Given that it is the state legislators who dictate this policy, we also consider the share of 
Republican representatives in state senates and houses of representatives (REPSTATE). We expect 
Republican constituencies to support higher speed limits and state chambers controlled by Republican 
parties to set higher speed limits. 
We introduce the GDP per capita and the Gini index, measuring income inequality, as our two 
economic indicators. We expect to find higher speed limits in states with higher GDP and greater 
inequality. Finally, the regional pattern already illustrated in the descriptive section is also introduced in 
our model by using the degrees of geographical longitude and latitude of the states. However, since 
non-parametric regressions showed a quadratic relationship between speed limits and longitude, we 
model this functional form by introducing the square value of the geographical longitude. 
Despite using different specifications for the empirical analysis, we present our basic equation in the 
following form (Equation 2): 
 
Yi = α0 + β1POP95i + β2SIZEi + β3 ALTITUDEi+ β4FAT95i + β5REPPRESi + β6GDPi + β7 
GINIi + β8LATITi + β9LONGITi + β10LONGITi 2  + εi (2) 
Table 4 summarizes the definitions and descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of the 
variables employed in the parametric analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                    Document de Treball 2010/02 pàg. 15 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                     Working Paper           2010/02 pag. 15 
 
 
 
Table 4. 
Definition and descriptive statistics of variables employed in parametric analysis. 
Variables Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
MDRIVEN95 Private Vehicle-Miles driven per inhabitant in 1995 (Thousands) 1,167 0.69 
POP95 State Population in 1995 (Thousands) 5,244 5,758 
SIZE State area in square miles 70,747 85,987 
ALTITUDE Meters of elevation 543.34 555.5 
FAT95 Rate of road fatalities per 100 million miles driven 1.79 0.44 
REPPRES Average share of Republican votes in presidential elections 1996 and 2000  46.2 7.78 
REPSTATE Average share of Republican representatives in state senate and house 
1994-2002 
46.71 15.09 
GDP Gross Domestic Product (state) per capita 36,412 6,515 
GINI Index Gini of income inequality 0.529 0.587 
LATIT Geographical degrees of latitude of the eastern border of the state 37.02 6.15 
LONGIT Geographical degrees of longitude of the southern border of the state 90.1 17.81 
 
5. Results 
Table 5 shows the main results derived from applying our empirical strategy.8 Model (1) shows 
that the application of private mobility (MDRIVEN95) and safety outcomes (FAT95) just before 
repeal are both statistically significant and present the expected signs. In fact, these estimates 
suggest that there is a trade-off between private mobility and safety. States with greater needs for 
private mobility tend to enact higher speed limits, but the fact that they are also the ones that 
present the highest fatality rates does not impede these higher limits. In fact, our results from 
Models (1) and (2) seem to show that these states do not place a high value on traffic safety or, at 
least, they appear to believe that speed limits have little bearing on levels of road safety. The social 
appraisal of this trade off would seem a reasonable determinant of current speed limits.  
Table 5. 
Least squares estimates of US speed limit levels in rural interstates. 
Independent variables 
 
Model 
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Model  
(3) 
Model  
(4) 
MDRIVEN95 2.3980(2.49)** - - - 
POP95 - -0.21660(-3.19)*** -0.1365(-2.30)*** -0.2001 (-3.35)*** 
SIZE - 0.0678(5.51)*** 0.0399(5.49)*** 0.0424 (4.44)*** 
ALTITUDE - 0.0007(0.67) 0.0020(2.23)** 0.0024 (2.02)* 
FAT95 2.7836 (2.13)** 1.7021 (2.22)** -0.6955(-0.57) -0.9513 (-0.67) 
REPPRES - - 0.1935(2.61)*** - 
REPSTATE - - - 0.0198 (0.90) 
GDP - - -0.0002(-0.46) -0.0001(-1.57) 
GINI - - 0.0331(0.25) 0.2135(2.06)** 
LATIT - - -0.1189 
(-1.52) 
-0.2144 (-2.18)** 
LONGIT - - 0.4480(1.97)* 0.7291(3.40)*** 
LONGIT^2 - - -0.0024(2.35)** -0.0038(-3.90)*** 
R2 0.32 0.64 0.81 0.77 
                                                 
8 Common tests for misspecification, normality and multicollinearity were performed and gave satisfactory 
results. The Ramsey Reset Test did not reject the null hypothesis of not having omitted any variables, the 
Variance Inflation Factor was below 2 and the Jarque-Bera test of normality accepted the null hypothesis of 
being normally distributed. 
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F-test (Joint Significance) 19.54*** 37.96*** 91.37*** 73.03*** 
        Note 1. Robust to heteroscedasticity t-statistics in parenthesis. Each model includes an intercept.   
 
Indeed, the geographical characteristics of each state appear to account for the levels of private 
mobility recorded, as we have demonstrated previously with the descriptive statistics. For this reason 
we replaced the number of private vehicle miles driven per capita with three geographical 
characteristics: population (POP), state size (SIZE) and altitude (ALTITUDE) in Model (2). Our 
results show that only the last variable –altitude- does not seem to contribute to the formulation of 
speed limits. By contrast, population and state size recorded the expected sign. Highly populated states 
present lower speed limits given the higher levels of urbanization, while the opposite is the case in 
large states, reflecting it would seem their lower density levels and the greater distances that have to be 
covered, and hence the creation of more social interest for making time savings. 
In addition to these variables, we extended the model to include political, economic and regional 
variables when further assessing the determinants of speed limit levels in Model (3). We found that 
the political variable used (REPPRES), which distinguishes the share of Republican votes in each state, 
is highly statistically significant. This coefficient indicates that states with high shares of Republican 
votes in presidential elections are strongly correlated with the setting of higher speed limits. By 
contrast, the economic variables tested do not seem to have any impact on this policy area. Finally, the 
regional variables provide interesting results. On the one hand, we observed that western states set 
higher speed limits (LONGIT), although this trend changed along the west coast itself (LONGIT2) as 
indicated by the non-parametric regressions run in the previous section. The latitude and therefore, the 
South-North matching, does not provide statistically significant estimates in Model (3). 
In the case of the political variables, it might be claimed that policy decisions are made in the state 
chambers, and not at the national level. This being the case, the Republican votes taken into account 
should be those cast for the state senate and the state house of representatives. This variable would 
capture better the political majority taking decisions on speed limits, although we believe the 
(REPPRES) variable captures constituency ideology better. However, when we use the share of 
Republican representatives in the state houses, we find that the political variable loses its significance 
(Model 4). Therefore, we conclude that in matters regulating speed limits the political party with 
responsibility for taking decisions is not important; rather, it is the general political ideology of the 
constituency in each state which counts. To some extent, this was highlighted in the senate itself when 
it voted in favor of repealing the national speed limit. 
Why, it might be asked, did the Republican Party have such a strong interest in defending the 
devolution of speed limit regulations and in setting higher speeds? In addition to the Republican 
Party’s traditional pro-decentralization stance -reflecting its desire to limit federal government powers, 
there are other likely motives underpinning this behavior. To examine this question in more detail 
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(although identifying the determinants of votes cast for the Republican Party is not an objective of this 
paper), we ran a very simple model in which we introduced: economic (income and income inequality), 
demographic (percentage of non-white population), and ideological (rate of abortions per 1000 
women) variables. By so doing, we seek to explain the share of Republican votes in the presidential 
elections by state. In addition to these determinants, we added the number of private vehicle-miles 
driven per inhabitant in order to estimate whether this had any impact on the number of Republican 
voters in presidential elections. This analysis takes the form of equation (2): 
 
REPPRESi = α0 + β1MDRIVENi+ β2INCOMEi + β3GINIi + β4NONWHITEi + β5ABORTIONSi 
+ ui    
                    (2) 
Table 6 displays the least squares estimates of this model, which lend support to the hypothesis that 
Republican voters tend to be more dependent on their private mobility. For this reason, there is a 
direct relationship between the formulation of speed limits and the benefits of Republican voters, 
although this result ought to be treated with some caution given the model’s simplicity.  
Table 6. 
Determinants of Republican votes in Presidential elections 
Independent variables Model  
(5) 
MDRIVEN 3.5379 (2.40)** 
INCOME -0.0007 (-2.35)** 
GINI 0.1721(0.41) 
ABORTIONS -0.2487(-1.91)* 
NON-WHITE 0.1177 (1.21) 
R2 0.47 
F-test (Joint Significance) 20.28*** 
                  Note 1. Robust to heteroscedasticity t-statistics in parenthesis. Each model  
includes an intercept.  
              Note 2. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
 
A further important test was run to determine whether there were any time or regional dependence 
effects in the decisions made regarding speed limits. This paper argues that social preferences underlie 
the formulation of speed limit levels, and since it is unlikely that these values change much in such a 
short period of time, we would expect that those states with higher speed limits before the 
centralization of this measure would opt to reestablish higher speed limits after devolution. Thus, 
centralization can be considered a historical accident in the matching of social preferences and 
transport policy. Likewise, we argue that geographical characteristics are key factors in determining 
speed limits. Consequently, we would also expect states with a common border to set similar speed 
limits. In order to account for these time and regional dependence effects we ran Model (6).9 Table 7 
displays the main results from running this test. As can be observed, both time and regional 
                                                 
9 We were unable to include these variables in the earlier models due to problems of collinearity. Moreover, 
these variables correlated highly with most of the variables used earlier. 
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dependence effects seem to play an important role in the formulation of speed limits. States that 
tended to have higher speed limits chose to raise the levels again following repeal, and states with 
neighbors operating higher speed limits tend to set high speed limits themselves. 
 
 
 Table 7. 
Time and regional dependence effects. Least squares estimates on current speed limits. 
Independent variables Model  
(6) 
Correlation 
PREVIOUS (time) 0.0864 (2.10)** 0.43 
BORDER (regional) 7.3748 (6.25)*** 0.68 
R2 0.48 - 
F-test (Joint Significance) 55.15*** - 
    Note 1. Robust to heterocedasticity t-statistics in parenthesis. Each model includes an intercept.  
Note 2. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper has considered variables related to geography, ideology, economics and road safety in 
investigating the factors that account for the provisions established in speed limit laws. We have found 
that geography, ideology, and regional patterns influence speed limits and help to explain the 
differences that exist between the US states. Furthermore, we have also found that the territorial 
diversity in social preferences as regards speed limits and the trade-off between mobility and road 
safety influences the decision as to whether speed limits should be centralized at the federal level or 
regulated by the states, as well as the limits that are currently in force across the country.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Here, we provide the first evidence –
to the best of our knowledge- of the actual determinants of speed limits, whereas until now the 
literature in this field has tended to focus almost exclusively on the impact of speed limit changes on 
road safety outcomes. More importantly perhaps we include within our analysis geographical and 
ideological factors as determinants of speed limits and as factors in the centralization-devolution 
debate. Such factors have been largely neglected in much of the previous empirical literature on speed 
limits, although, as we hope we have shown, they seem to play an important role in the formulation of 
speed limit policy.  
Our analysis and the results we obtain provide new insights into the speed limit debate. Moreover, 
they have interesting policy implications in future policy debates and legislative procedures influenced 
by regional diversity and the markedly different social preferences manifest by the states. 
Indeed, the future debate on the centralization of speed limit laws might be triggered by 
environmental concerns and worries related to energy consumption. Were this to be the case, social 
preferences determined by regional and geographical mobility patterns, together with ideological 
attitudes governing the centralization-devolution discussion, are likely to shape the debate and its 
outcome. 
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